Part One: Reflections on the 1989 Democracy Movement
Chapter Two: On the Outcome of the 1989 Democratic Movement’s Failure
Solzhenitsyn pointed out that totalitarian societies are maintained through lies and violence together. When lies are effective, they are not seen as lies but as truth, and through the cover of lies, violence is no longer seen as violence but as the power of the people. The current situation is: lies have gone bankrupt, lies are revealed as lies: violence is openly staged, violence is manifested as violence.
— Excerpt from the article
The vigorous 1989 pro-democracy movement ended in a very tragic and unfortunate way. Thinking back to the early days of the sport, how many people eagerly anticipated it, and the optimism and confidence that filled millions during the sport’s peak, we cannot help but say. Its ending runs counter to our wishes. In the strict sense of ‘things going against our wishes,’ we must acknowledge the failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement.
Of course, for the Ichizumi Justice movement, its failures always leave many positive legacies. But that doesn’t mean failure is no longer failure. Avoiding the word ‘failure’ is not a sign of bravery. It hinders us from facing reality, summarizing experiences, and regaining strength in order to strive for the next success.
1. The 1989 Democracy Movement: Failure or Success?
Some believe that the 1989 pro-democracy movement did not fail. On the contrary, it achieved great success. Because it fully exposed the brutal nature of the CCP authorities, sparking more awakening and resistance, thereby creating the most crucial conditions for the collapse of the authoritarian system.
This viewpoint certainly has its merits. The 1989 pro-democracy movement, with unprecedented mass participation, moderate, and deeply popular demands, and peaceful, rational, nonviolent methods of resistance, pushed the stubborn CCP authorities into a dead end, exposing the irrationality of the Ding regime to the world: although the June Fourth massacre temporarily suppressed popular resistance, it also completely deprived the CCP authorities of the legitimacy of their rule. Undoubtedly, the 1989 pro-democracy movement has profoundly changed China. Some say the June Fourth massacre has brought China back to the era of the Cultural Revolution. This statement is incorrect. Because today’s CCP rule has completely lost the deceptive nature it possessed over the past decades, including the Cultural Revolution era, and has degenerated into a blatant violent rule. According to Kuron, advisor to the Polish Solidarity union and theorist of the democratic movement, totalitarianism is about including every member of society and forming a kind of social contract. The more perfect a totalitarian regime is, the better it is at hiding its violent nature. A successful totalitarian system is not only because it comprehensively oppresses the people, but also because the people are unconsciously aware of this oppression and even actively participate in it. In this sense, the 1989 Democratic Movement was a rejection of the totalitarian system, and the June Fourth Massacre was also a denial of totalitarianism. We cannot say how many years China has ‘regressed’ today, because certain social processes are irreversible—the most important is the transformation of people’s hearts. Solzhenitsyn pointed out that totalitarian societies are maintained through lies and violence together. When lies are effective, they are not seen as lies but as truth, and through the cover of lies, violence is no longer seen as violence but as the power of the people. The current situation is: lies have gone bankrupt, lies are revealed as lies: violence is openly staged, violence is manifested as violence. At this point, totalitarianism reached its demise. In short, the great significance of the 1989 pro-democracy movement cannot be underestimated.
2. On the failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement
Nevertheless, we still believe the 1989 pro-democracy movement was unsuccessful. Because:
First, the essence of success is that the consequences align with the purpose. The purpose of the 1989 Democratic Movement was to fight for basic freedoms and rights, and to establish and expand autonomous public interaction spaces. The consequences of the campaign clearly failed to achieve these goals and even caused serious losses of existing achievements. So it was a failure, not a success.
Indeed, some participants may have different intentions. According to a video speech by Chai Ling at the end of May, she said:
What we expect is bloodshed. When the government finally resorts to slaughter at the height of its rogue behavior, I believe only when the square is filled with blood will the entire nation truly open its eyes and unite.
From Chai Ling’s words, the results of the exercise happened to meet her expectations, so we can say it was a success. However, the vast majority of participants in the 1989 pro-democracy movement certainly did not share Chai Ling’s goals and expectations, and Chai Ling herself probably did not have such intentions from the very beginning of the movement. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude based on Chai Ling’s words that the 1989 pro-democracy movement achieved its goal.
In fact, even according to Chai Ling’s envisioned goals, we cannot say the 1989 pro-democracy movement was successful. Because when the square was filled with bloodshed, the entire nation did not ‘unite’ as she had hoped. This is not only because after June Fourth, mainland China has seen even more severe negative phenomena such as betrayal, alienation, betrayal, and mutual suspicion compared to before (which is precisely the opposite of unity); but more importantly, when we discuss issues from a realpolitik perspective, we must focus on the reality rather than its potential possibilities. Although after June Fourth, the Chinese people have become even more united against the Communist ruling group deep down. But in social reality, they have become more isolated and lonely than before. After all, we cannot simply regard the seeds of success as success itself.
Second, for a long time, many people have blindly believed in an uncriticized assertion: ‘The deeper the oppression, the fiercer the resistance.’ ‘I once added a footnote after this sentence—’Within the limits of elasticity.’ Experience has repeatedly shown that harsh oppression provokes resistance, and it often inspires idealism and heroism more than a dull, comfortable life. However, excessive harsh oppression will extinguish resistance; in fact, it can compress resistance to an almost invisible degree. Excessive and harsh oppression is meant to bruise rather than provoke, erode rather than foster idealism and heroism. History throughout history and across the world shows that large-scale movements against tyranny do not erupt when tyranny is at its severest, but rather when tyranny is less severe. The 1989 pro-democracy movement occurred during the period when the CCP’s dictatorship remained unchanged, but its harshness was far from what it once was. The June Fourth massacre, on the other hand, restored this despotism to extreme severity, and as later facts revealed, it did not provoke stronger resistance, but rather quelled (though perhaps only temporarily) resistance. Note: Awareness of rebellion and resistance itself are different. The June Fourth Massacre reinforced the former and weakened the latter. Now, few believe that a larger-scale resistance will erupt domestically in the near future than the 1989 pro-democracy movement. Most pin their hopes on the next wave of the movement until after Deng Xiaoping’s death or when new divisions arise at the top—that is, when harsh oppression resurfaces weak links. It is clear that people intuitively understand the inhibitory effect of high pressure on resistance. However, because many people in theory uncritically believe in the so-called ‘the deeper the oppression, the fiercer the resistance,’ and the dialectical logic of ‘the worse, the better,’ the result is that when these people lead the movement toward danger, they still claim it is a path to victory and call obvious failure a success.
We see that in the same speech, Chai Ling complained about the Chinese people. She said: After May 28th, I became increasingly sorrowful. …… I want to say it, but I’ve always been reluctant to say it. Sometimes I have to say, that’s what it means to be Chinese. I’m not worth fighting for you, sacrificing myself for you.
Behind this frustration of not growing up to life, there is undoubtedly deep love. However, Chai Ling loves those brave Chinese people, and among the real Chinese, those kinds are not the majority. Why does Chai Ling complain about the Chinese people? Because she found that when the government raised its blade in the most rogue state, most Chinese people did not unite in desperate resistance as she had expected (not as many people actually did this as she imagined), but instead became panicked, retreated, and fled. This is certainly heartbreaking. Chai Ling’s psychology is exactly that of a radical revolutionary. Deep in the heart of every radical revolutionary, there was a profound sense of resentment toward the masses, frustrated by their lack of ability. From the perspective of moral ideals, this reproach is correct—because you can inspire the masses to surpass themselves; but from the perspective of realpolitik, this reproach is incorrect—because you cannot demand that a person no longer be themselves. In fact, during the 1989 pro-democracy movement, ordinary Chinese people already performed very well, truly outstandingly. Through television broadcasts, the whole world has come to see Chinese people in a new light. In those days, many people recalled a phrase Lenin once said: Revolution is a grand festival for the people. This is what is called a festival. It refers not only to joy and excitement, but also to the sacred and the sublime (many Western festivals are related to religion). When two bicycles collided, people no longer argued as before, but apologized to each other: even the thieves announced ‘stop stealing’: the entire city of Beijing saw unprecedented public security and moral integrity. Many people say that the ugliness of Chinese people is caused by authoritarian oppression. This statement is profound but not complete. I believe that under the conditions of a free and democratic society, Chinese people will become a bit better, but I don’t believe everyone will become a sage. After all, people can’t celebrate festivals every day. The ordinary, trivial realities of life don’t make people always feel elated, otherworldly. A group of brave university students used the great power of role models to ignite the sacred fire in the hearts of the masses, but such moving scenes cannot last long. Whoever is not skilled at lighting this sacred fire cannot launch a great mass movement; however, whoever holds too high expectations for the sustained burning power of this sacred fire may cause the movement to fail. In fact, even college students themselves cannot sustain this heroic romantic sentiment for most of them long-term. The chaos within the student corps in the later stages of the movement is an undeniable fact. People with radical revolutionary temperament thought that taking things to the extreme would bring about a miracle. But there are no miracles in this world. On the contrary, mortal humans in the flesh cannot endure being suspended high in the clouds for long periods and are forced to fall. Thus, after a period of passionate progress, people returned to a reality lacking poetry: the bloody massacre did not lead to greater resistance. But it only caused widespread depression once again.
We talked about radical revolutionaries. Historically, radical revolutionaries certainly achieved victories. But their victories were hardly built solely on the romantic enthusiasm of the masses. The successful radical revolutions in history are not as poetic as later generations describe. Revolution is rarely the product of unilateral high pressure by the rulers; it is often also the product deliberately pursued by a group of revolutionaries. Because any ruler, while maintaining brutal oppression, must always pay attention to giving people the chance to survive in obedience; and revolutionaries, in order to draw ordinary people into the vortex of irreconcilable struggle, cannot rely solely on stirring a sense of justice and resistance; they must also do their best to obstruct and cut off any possibility that allows ordinary people to survive and to improve the slave survival (think of the story in Water Margin where many people are forced to join Liangshan). Without this latter type of work, revolution would be difficult to occur, hard to develop, and hard to succeed. The logic of ‘putting yourself in desperate situations to survive’ is the logic of radical revolutionaries. Therefore, radical revolutionaries usually have very hard hearts, and the longer the revolution lasts, the harder their hearts become.
No one is willing to sacrifice themselves for the enemy. Someone who believes they are unworthy of sacrifice for the people is probably also unwilling to do so. If such people are thrown into a highly dangerous struggle, their dedication often stems from impulses for self-realization or a sense of comradeship toward a small group of outstanding individuals. This spirit is great, but because it contains a considerable degree of cynicism, it is not without flaws. Such situations often occur: some people, pained by the oppression of the people by autocracy, join the struggle against despotism. Their feelings initially contained a mix of compassion and compassion; however, as the struggle intensified and became more brutal, they found that so many people wavered and retreated, developing a cynical attitude of complaining about the masses. Compassion and cynicism are two easily confused but very different things. What they have in common is a conscious recognition of one’s own superiority, but the difference lies in their attitude toward others. More precisely, it is a different attitude toward others, toward the weaknesses of ordinary people. Compassionate and cynical people deeply understand the weaknesses of ordinary people—their timidity, vulgarity, and selfishness—but the former hold a sympathetic and understanding attitude toward these weaknesses, hoping they will improve. But we don’t force them to change, and at the same time, we tolerate their shortcomings: the latter tend to deny or even disdain these weaknesses, finding it hard to tolerate them staying in their original state, and almost forcing them to become better. Radical revolutionaries are often cynical rather than compassionate, which is one reason revolutions can lead to autocracy. Although the autocracy established by a sincere radical revolutionary often carries patriarchal traits and is not the same as ordinary tyrannical or pampered autocracy. But after all, that is different from democracy. Democracy only prevents the brutal side of the people from tolerating their general weaknesses. A good democratic reformist politician certainly does not have to be like Christ, but in Him. The element of compassion for the world is actually even greater. He was reluctant to deliberately pursue the so-called ‘survival after putting himself in a desperate situation.’ Of course, he knows ‘no risk, no gain,’ but he strives to keep risks within what most people can and are willing to endure. Even if the results of this approach may make its achievements less quick and brilliant.
Radical revolution and democratic reform are two very different movements. Both need to highlight contradictions. Revolutionaries must strive to intensify contradictions, make the barriers between friend and foe clear, and move all political forces toward simple polarization; reformers must strive to separate and diversify contradictions. Revolutionaries must make politics tough and strict, while reformers need to keep politics flexible and adaptable at all times. The revolutionaries wanted to leave neither side with a way out. Reformers, on the other hand, must always make it possible for their conflicts to ease. Generally speaking, reform requires more political wisdom than revolution, and revolution requires more political conditions than reform. The wisdom required for reform can be simply put into a matter of the art of knowing what to do; the conditions required for revolution are simply psychological and material preparation to fight violence with violence. If a movement fails to maintain proper balance and tends to be extreme, and at the same time, people are not mentally or materially prepared to fight violence with violence. Then it is very difficult for this sport to escape the fate of failure.
I am by no means vaguely or uniformlydisagreeing with the approach of radical revolutionaries, because in some cases, the approach of radical revolutionaries may be the best approach. But the 1989 pro-democracy movement was certainly not an exception. The 1989 pro-democracy movement itself was a democratic reform movement. The reason it later took on a somewhat radical revolutionary stance was simply due to a lack of political wisdom among the people, resulting in a misguided stance. Because the necessary political conditions were lacking, the 1989 pro-democracy movement ultimately did not become a true radical revolution. Therefore, whether from the perspective of democratic reform or radical revolution, this movement did not succeed.
Third, at the beginning of this section, I mentioned that the 1989 pro-democracy movement (including its tragic end) meant a complete rejection of totalitarian rule. So, can we conclude from this that it is a success? I thought it was still impossible. Because this denial was actually basically completed even before the 1989 pro-democracy movement. The 1989 pro-democracy movement strengthened our awareness of opposing the existing system, but we already had enough reserves of this opposition before (otherwise, the 1989 pro-democracy movement would not have happened). What we have always lacked is the opportunity or space to express this sense of resistance. The outcome of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was that what we already had became more and more, while what we originally lacked became even less and less. Therefore, weighing the actual effects of this one-and–off situation can be said to be not worth it.
Fourth, some might say that the Tiananmen Movement in 1976 was also brutally suppressed, but wasn’t it precisely that movement that provided the most solid foundation for the October coup six months later?
This statement is certainly correct, but it still confuses the failure of Ichizumi’s cause of justice with the positive legacy left by that failure. Failure, as the saying goes, is often the mother of success, but failure is not truly success. Moreover, to turn today’s failure into tomorrow’s success, many conditions and our new efforts are needed. Failure does not absolutely translate into success. In the near future, China not only has the potential to improve, but also to become worse or even worse, so we cannot deny the reality of current failure based on some possibility of future success.
Fifth, some say the 1989 movement completely exposed the stubbornness and brutality of the central regime and stirred up a deeper sense of resistance among the people. Therefore, from a historical perspective, The 1989 pro-democracy movement actually accelerated, not delayed, the complete collapse of the autocratic system. According to these people’s analysis, if the 1989 democracy movement had ‘stopped while ahead,’ its achievements would still be very limited. Because such limited success blurs the people’s will to break with the entire totalitarian system, making people satisfied with gradual reforms bit by bit, it ultimately takes much longer to fully reject the totalitarian system. In contrast, although the 1989 pro-democracy movement was temporarily thwarted by bloody suppression, if it were to rise again, it would inevitably be ‘one and the last attempt’ to completely crush the autocratic system.
I do not dare to agree with this viewpoint. Not to mention that we cannot make a definitive statement yet; we can only speculate that the next time the pro-democracy movement rises, it is very likely to end with a ‘one-time strike.’ And speculation is not reliable evidence. More importantly, even if we accept this speculation, we still cannot conclude that the setbacks of the 1989 pro-democracy movement will accelerate the collapse of the authoritarian system more than its ‘quit while ahead.’ Together, to fundamentally change totalitarian authoritarianism, democratic reform and radical revolution are two approaches. Regardless of the degree of pain involved, focusing solely on time, whether the latter will happen faster than the former is highly doubtful. Indeed, reform is a ‘phased and phased’ revolution, while a revolution is a reform that ‘completes the task in one battle.’ Therefore, at first glance, the revolutionary process seems shorter than the reform process. However, since brewing a revolution itself takes a long time, the actual situation is often as follows: when a ‘one-time’ revolution finally breaks out in place A, the ‘phased and batched’ reforms in place B have already been successfully completed.
Specifically, if the 1989 pro-democracy movement had ‘quit while ahead’ and was later spurred by dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, then today’s one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party in mainland China may have already come to an end. What reason do we have to say that the setbacks of the 1989 pro-democracy movement will actually accelerate the collapse of the authoritarian system?
Moreover, we should understand: the collapse of an authoritarian regime is one thing, but the establishment of a democratic system is another. The two do not always happen simultaneously. Romania’s democratic prospects are clearly no more optimistic than those of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic. In a gradual process of democratic reform, the rise and fall of authoritarian and democratic forces is often proportional: when authoritarian forces retreat, democratic forces grow by a little. Therefore, for democratic reform, the end of autocratic regimes is almost equivalent to the establishment of democratic institutions. Radical revolutions are different. In modern society, radical revolutions are rarely caused purely by grassroots forces; they are often the result of armed rebellion by some within the old regime. Therefore, after a revolution succeeds, those in power mainly come from certain factions within the old regime, with very few from the original grassroots forces. Today, many of the main figures in Romania’s provisional government are prominent figures in the former Communist government. This is somewhat similar to the situation after the Xinhai Revolution, where former Beiyang warlords and constitutionalists in the Qing dynasty held dominant positions. So its results are often less reliable. Contrary to the imagination of many friends who favor radical revolution, radical revolution is more likely to be incomplete and more likely to result in a situation where ‘old medicine in the same bottle.’ Of course, this is not always the case. However, we should not ignore this possibility.
In short, the view that the setback of the 1989 pro-democracy movement would actually accelerate the complete collapse of autocracy and thus make it more successful, lacks the power to break the rules. Undoubtedly, we must face the tragic end of the 1989 pro-democracy movement. We strive to turn negative factors into positive ones, striving to bring new and positive outcomes from bad things. However, we must admit that the actual outcome of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was indeed unfortunate.
3. The democracy movement should have a strong sense of utilitarianism
The reason I repeatedly prove here that the outcome of the 1989 pro-democracy movement was failure and failure is certainly not to give an unchangeable fact a more accurate name. I hope this will help me reflect on the widespread romanticism among us pro-democracy activists: when many people fight for a cause of historical significance they firmly believe is just, they often have a tendency to be indifferent to success or failure, or at least not to pay the utmost attention. This psychology may be morally great and moving, but politically not necessarily appropriate. We must understand that when we engage in a realistic democratic movement, it is not just to save our souls, prove our conscience, and realize our true selves, nor just to have the whole world pay tribute to us, let history remember our names, and let future generations admire our spirit. More importantly, we strive to achieve real success, to improve the environment we live in, and to enable everyone to live better than before. Without this strong, conscious, clear-headed, and realistic utilitarian consciousness, we are not engaging in politics but merely pursuing moral self-fulfillment.
Reflections on China’s Democracy Movement (Oxford University Press, 1992).
Hu Ping website