Author: Hu Ping, July 9, 2018
There are many opinions on how to define the Cultural Revolution. I believe that to clarify “what the Cultural Revolution is,” it is better to start from the opposite side, first clarifying “what the Cultural Revolution is not.” Once you understand “what the Cultural Revolution is not,” “what is the Cultural Revolution” becomes clearer.
1. The Cultural Revolution was not a mass rebellion to denounce those in power
A popular view holds that the Cultural Revolution was Mao Zedong’s call for ‘rebellion is justified’ and mobilized the masses to criticize and struggle with those in power. I do not agree with this view.
Indeed, compared to other political movements during the Mao era, the Cultural Revolution had a major characteristic: during the Cultural Revolution, there was a time when Mao Zedong even called on the masses to rebel and denounce those in power. At that time, the masses could write big-character posters and small newspapers, form combat teams and combat corps, hold large meetings and organize marches, and organize large-scale rallies across the country. Under the banner of “criticizing the bourgeois reactionary line” and “criticizing the capitalist path of those in power,” the masses could “bombard” and “burn” almost all levels of leaders, even imprison the cattle shed for labor reform, and even seize their power. You could say that mass rebellion and denouncing those in power were the greatest features of the Cultural Revolution; But if you use this to define the Cultural Revolution and assert that it was just mass rebellion and denouncing the ruling faction, that is wrong.
Because throughout the Cultural Revolution, mass rebellions and criticism of those in power were just one part of the story and far from the whole story; Even according to the three-year Cultural Revolution theory, it is only one segment. This is the first point. Second, facts proved that Mao’s extraordinary actions were merely political maneuvering; Mao merely treated the masses as tools and discarded them once they were used. Shortly after revolutionary committees at all levels were established and the country turned red, Mao Zedong immediately launched campaigns such as “Cleansing the Class Ranks,” “Investigating May 16th,” and “One Strike, Three Antis.” These movements were essentially a counterattack against the rebels against the masses, settling scores after the fact.
Here, we especially need to discuss the “Investigation of May 16” movement.
Mr. Yang Jisheng pointed out in his book ‘Heaven and Earth Upside Down—History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution’: ‘The movement that lasted the longest and suffered the most victims during the Cultural Revolution was the May 16th Movement.’ This movement began in August 1967, peaked in 1970 and 1971, basically stopped in 1972, and only ended in 1976. The number of people investigated reached tens of millions, and the number of deaths reached 100,000. The number of people labeled as ‘May 16 members’ far exceeded the number of counterrevolutionaries fought in the ‘fifty days’ of the early movement; The most ironic thing is that those who were labeled counterrevolutionaries in the early stages of the movement, then rehabilitated as rebel leaders, and even entered the Revolutionary Committee, except for the middle school rebels, were almost all labeled as “May 16 members” during the “May 16th Investigation” campaign.
The so-called “May 16 investigation” was essentially suppressing rebels. Yang Xiguang (also known as Yang Xiaokai) had long seen through this. While the Party Central Committee was vigorously launching the “May 16th Investigation” campaign, Yang Xiaokai was serving his sentence in prison under the charge of being “counter-revolutionary.” Yang Xiaokai exchanged ideas with fellow refugees, pointing out: “The investigation of May 16” is essentially persecuting rebels. The “May 16th Investigation” campaign marked Mao’s shift from supporting rebels to persecuting them. Yang Xiaokai believed, “On the surface, Zhou Enlai was very active in persecuting the rebels, but the instigator was Old Mao.” Yang Xiaokai also said: “According to the charges of ‘May 16,’ anyone who rebelled can be counted as ‘May 16,’ but ‘May 16’ was actually an obscure student organization in Beijing with just a few dozen people, and most people didn’t know about it. So those in power could arbitrarily label those they disliked as ‘May 16,’ and since ‘May 16’ was against Zhou Enlai, Mao could use ‘May 16′ to curry favor with him.’ ”
So, why did Mao Zedong turn his attention from supporting rebels to suppressing them? I thought the reason was not complicated. Because when Mao Zedong launched the mass rebellion, it was only to overthrow Liu Shaoqi and his political enemies and carry out a major purge. Once this goal was achieved, the rebels as tools lost their value. Moreover, to establish and maintain the authority of the so-called new red regime and to reestablish the principle that Party leadership is inviolable, it is necessary to restrain and prohibit all kinds of “rebelling” behaviors. However, mass rebellion was originally strongly incited by Mao Zedong, and Mao could not openly go back on his word. Therefore, he used a trumped-up pocket crime to severely crack down on the rebels as a warning to others. Moreover, in the earlier phase of the campaign, cadres of all sizes were attacked. Although they had regained power, they still harbored deep resentment. To appease them, Mao Zedong wanted to give them a chance to vent. Since these cadres themselves did not dare to directly express dissatisfaction with Mao, they vented their grievances on the masses, using the pretext of “investigation of May 16” to counterattack the rebels.
Fifty years have passed since the Cultural Revolution, yet the background and inside story of the “May 16th Investigation” remain strictly confidential by the authorities. This indirectly proves that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four bear little responsibility for the “516” investigation. Based solely on the existing materials, we can assert that the “May 16th Investigation” was personally led by Mao Zedong. Because without Mao’s initiation and recognition, this movement could never have started, let alone grown so big and long. Another example is Zhou Enlai. Zhou Enlai should have been the direct commander of this movement. Because it was precisely Zhou’s several speeches that turned “May 16th” into a baseless pocket crime. Half of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was labeled as “May 16,” and since the Ministry had always been Zhou’s turf, Zhou could not have been unaware of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ “investigation of May 16.” This shows just how ruthless Zhou was. Given this, it is understandable that even today, the authorities still maintain strict confidentiality about the background and inside information of the “May 16th Investigation,” as it requires maintaining the image of Mao and Zhou. Those who praise the Cultural Revolution deliberately avoid the “May 16th Investigation” campaign. Because they knew that whenever the “May 16th Investigation” campaign arose, their wishful glorification of the Cultural Revolution and Mao would completely lose its ground.
By 1974, in the later stages of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong launched the Campaign to Criticize Lin and Criticize Confucius. In some places, the rebels had already ceased their activities, but now they thought they could rebel again. They regrouped and tried to put big-character posters on the streets to restore or rebuild the anti-revolutionary organization, but were immediately stopped by the authorities. It is clear that while Mao Zedong was still alive, he did not allow the masses to rebel again.
Indeed, the mass rebellion during the Cultural Revolution was initiated by Mao Zedong, but it was also suppressed by Mao. Please note, the suppression of the rebel movement was only vigorously carried out after revolutionary committees at all levels were established and the country turned red across the country, and only after Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line achieved a great and decisive victory. Therefore, no matter what, you cannot blame this on the capitalist roaders, the bureaucratic group, or the anti-Cultural Revolution line; This debt can only be attributed to Mao Zedong himself, to Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line, and to the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, characterizing the Cultural Revolution as a mass rebellion and denouncing the ruling party contradicts the facts and is unfounded.
2. The Cultural Revolution was not an anti-bureaucratic group
Another popular view is that the Cultural Revolution was an anti-bureaucratic group.
The
strangest aspect of the Cultural Revolution was that Mao Zedong, as chairman of the Communist Party, actually called on and encouraged the masses to rise up and challenge the Communist Party he led; Mao Zedong was originally the highest official, yet he called on and encouraged the masses to rise up and challenge the bureaucratic group that supported his power. Many people, based on this characteristic, characterized the Cultural Revolution as an anti-bureaucratic group.
It is clear that this viewpoint characterizing the Cultural Revolution as an anti-bureaucratic group is very similar to the above view of the Cultural Revolution as mass rebellion and denouncing the ruling faction—almost two sides of the same coin. Therefore, we can also use the same reasons to reject this view. We won’t repeat it here.
There are two more points. 1. Claiming that the Cultural Revolution was Mao Zedong destroying the party that was still his supreme leader and the bureaucratic group that was still his highest official is itself problematic. Because at that time, the party was represented by a leader, and the entire bureaucratic group was represented by its highest official. This is a fundamental characteristic of Leninist parties. The entire movement is conducted in the name of the leader, and thus in the name of the party. Throughout the movement, the Party and its leaders remained sacred and inviolable. Although many party organs and officials were purged, none of these were carried out in the name of opposition parties, but in the name of defending the party; Those purged were all accused of “anti-party” crimes (the so-called “three antis” elements, i.e., “anti-party, anti-socialist, anti-Mao Zedong Thought”). Additionally, the Party organization of the military was basically unaffected. We know that in the autumn of 1968, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued the “Directive on Resuming Party Organizational Activities in Units Where Revolutionary Committees Have Already Been Established.” Mao then proposed “rejecting the old and accepting the new,” with the Party organization widely recruiting new members and promoting many newcomers to leadership positions. From this, it is clear that the Cultural Revolution was less about destroying the Party and more accurately about rectifying the Party—a major overhaul and rectification of the Party.
2. Great dictators dislike bureaucratic groups, yet he knows well that he cannot live without them. To a greater extent, Mao and the bureaucratic group are one. Mao did not intend to “smash the old state apparatus.” China during the Mao era was a highly unified Party and state, with Party and government united. Therefore, we can use the term ‘Party’ as synonymous with state machinery or bureaucratic groups, or as ‘Party Rules the World.’ We know that during the Shanghai “January Storm” in 1967, Zhang Chunqiao proposed calling the leadership body established through the rebellion and seizure the commune a commune, but Mao Zedong did not agree. Mao Zedong said, “If everyone is called a commune, then what about the Party?” Where is the Party placed? There must be a party, a core. It is evident that even during the peak period of the masses’ rebellion and power struggle, when slogans like “kick out the Party committee and start a revolution” were everywhere, and Party committees at all levels were paralyzed by bombardment, Mao Zedong still had no intention of abandoning the Party, not intending to replace the Party with mass organizations, not intending to replace the Party Committee with the so-called Paris Commune, not abandoning the Party’s core position, not intending to change the Party’s realm—let alone other times.
Mao Zedong’s approach of mobilizing the masses to criticize Party organizations and cadres at all levels can be seen as a modern application of the ancient tyrant’s rule. Aristotle pointed out: “Suspicion is a characteristic of tyranny.” The king is maintained and supported by his followers; As for the usurper, he had his own strategy: he knew that everyone in the state wanted to overthrow him, but only his friends truly had the ability to overthrow him, so his friends were the least trustworthy, and special attention should be paid to them. To prevent his factions from ‘usurping the faction,’ the usurper sometimes had to exploit the lower classes. Sometimes tyrants deliberately indulged slaves and others of lower status. These people generally did not dislike the power of the usurper or participate in anti-usurpation activities; they often resented their masters or other high-ranking individuals, and were eager to expose their masters and eager to bring down or level the influential figures. Such people are even more eager to rule under tyrants, just as they enjoy a plebeian regime, and the tyrant is happy to act as a protector of the “small people” and a “leader of the people.” The communist totalitarian system differs from traditional monarchy and is more similar to tyranny. On one hand, the supreme leader must rely on a vast Party organization or bureaucratic system to exercise strict control over the entire society; On the other hand, party organizations or bureaucratic systems—especially at the top levels—may themselves become obstacles to the leader’s ability to carry out his will, or even a direct threat to the leader’s power. Therefore, shrewd leaders employ two sets of tactics: one using the Party organization to oppress the people, the other using the people to rectify the Party organization. Mao was both the Party Chairman and the highest official, and seemed to be the leader of the masses oppressed by the Party organization and bureaucratic system, embodying two opposing roles. This is the mystery of his role. Mao Zedong was worried that Communist officials at all levels would become less compliant and obedient, so he mobilized and used the masses to rise up and denounce the ruling faction, using the masses to carry out an unprecedented large-scale purge, then rebuild the bureaucratic system, making it a tool he personally excelled at, and suppress the rebels, thereby establishing his absolute authority and moving toward the highest degree of dictatorship.
3. The Cultural Revolution was not a project to realize a communist ideal state or a utopian society
Others believe the Cultural Revolution was Mao Zedong’s realization of his vision of a communist ideal state, a utopian social transformation project. If we want to find evidence for this viewpoint, the most important one is the May 7th Directive.
On May 7, 1966, Mao Zedong wrote a letter to Lin Biao, which later became known as the May 7th Directive. The May 7th directive proposed that all industries nationwide should become a university to study politics, military affairs, culture, engage in agricultural and sideline production, and run small and medium-sized factories, producing certain products they need and goods that can be exchanged with the state at equivalent value, while also criticizing the bourgeoisie.
In December 2013, Qi Benyu, a former member of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, published an article titled “Personally Listening to Chairman Mao’s May 7th Instructions—Commemorating the 120th Anniversary of Mao Zedong’s Birth.” The article states that on May 13, 1966, Mao Zedong summoned Chen Boda, Yang Chengwu, and Qi Benyu in Shanghai to seek their opinions on the May Seventh Directive (Jiang Qing was also present).
According to Qi Benyu’s recollections, Mao Zedong said that since ancient times, humanity has never had a long-term plan for social development; human society should have a long-term plan, which is what human civilization should be. The human civilization we talk about is communism. It was conceived by Marx based on the development of modern productive forces, and in books such as the Critiques of the Gotha Program, Marx discussed some concrete ideas about communism. Only a communist society can be considered a civilized society. I have talked about Zhang Lu before. Zhang Lu was a peasant leader at the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, a member of the Yellow Turban Movement, and he also had some communist ideas. These ideas probably originated from ancient texts describing the Great Unity World, but the description of that Great Unity World in ancient texts was very vague, because there was no new productive force at that time, making it impossible to concretize the future Great Unity World. In Zhang Lu’s era, society had progressed somewhat, so his world of great harmony became more concrete than before. Treating illnesses with Zhang Lu was free, and meals were free, but he couldn’t eat carelessly—just eat your fill. Some people, like some wealthy nobles, eat so much and waste so much—it’s not good! The Chairman said, “We have now found a better solution than Zhang Lu. The experience summarized by the PLA General Logistics Department is the budding future of a communist society, where everyone’s division of labor is not so rigid, focusing on one industry and developing comprehensively.” Besides military service, PLA soldiers could work and farm, learn cultural knowledge, and develop artistic talents. Workers’ labor should not be too intense, not work all day long, but combine labor with learning, with division of labor and cooperation. Leaders also need to work, regularly work and blend in with everyone. Distribution should allow for slight differences, but not too big; don’t create special classes or become a special class.
Next, Chen Boda, Yang Chengwu, and Qi Benyu each expressed their opinions on the “May 7th Directive.” Subsequently, after approval at the expanded meeting of the Central Political Bureau, the “May 7th Directive” was officially issued as an important document. The document states that the May 7th Directive “represents a groundbreaking new development in Marxism-Leninism.” In July 1966, Chen Boda proposed writing an editorial about the May 7th Directive to attract attention from the entire Party and the broad masses. When drafting the editorial outline, Chen Boda proposed that the May 7th Directive is the concept of a “blueprint for communism.” Chen Boda said that previous utopian socialism had no concrete plans, whereas Chairman Mao’s “May 7th Directive” was a concrete plan, a grand blueprint for realizing the communist ideal. On August 1, People’s Daily published an editorial titled “The Whole Country Should Become a Great School of Mao Zedong Thought—Commemorating the 39th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” which summarized the “May 7th Directive.” Qi Benyu also wrote that he initially did not fully understand the importance of the “May 7th Directive,” and did not consider its connection to the Cultural Revolution; “Later, I realized that at the very beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao had already envisioned what kind of society he wanted to build after the Cultural Revolution. His lectures on the May 7th Directive and communism were actually showing us the prospects of the Cultural Revolution.”
Logically, within the entire Mao Zedong Thought system, the May 7th Directive should hold a very important position. If the “May 16 Notice” was Mao Zedong’s program for “breaking” the Cultural Revolution, then the “May 7th Directive” was the program for “establishing.” However, in reality, throughout the Cultural Revolution, the influence and role of the May 7th Directive were quite limited. At that time, the Chinese people—especially young people—had a fervent worship and faith in Mao, with fervent passion and boiling blood that those who lived through it still vividly remembered, leaving behind a large number of written records along with numerous photographs and images. However, in contrast, the attention and enthusiasm given to the communist blueprint personally drawn by the great leader of the May 7th Directive were far too little.
As mentioned earlier, the “May 7th Directive” was first publicly released in the editorial of the People’s Daily on August 1, 1966. At that time, only its content was published, and it was not yet called the “May 7th Directive.” At that time, the Cultural Revolution was at the peak of the “Destroy the Four Olds,” and most people paid little attention to the “May 7th Directive.” It wasn’t until October 1967, when the central government called on university and middle school students to “resume classes and stir up revolution,” the “May 7th Directive” was proposed; But at that time, students were busy fighting factions or criticizing those in power, with almost no ‘classes’ to ‘resume’ and no attention focused on the ‘May 7th Directive.’ In May 1968, the Heilongjiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee established a farm in Liuhe, Qing’an County for labor training for government cadres, named the May Seventh Cadre School. In October of the same year, People’s Daily published a lengthy report stating that “the Liuhe ‘May Seventh Cadre School’ provided new experience for the revolutionary transformation of government agencies,” and quoted Mao Zedong’s latest instructions: “The broad masses of cadres being sent to work is an excellent opportunity for them to relearn, and everyone except the old, weak, sick, and disabled should do so.” Afterwards, May Seventh Cadre Schools were established across the country. Although the May Seventh Cadre School was named “May Seventh,” in reality, it was merely a farm for most cadres who were sidelined—that is, those not in leadership positions or in their original jobs—to be sent down to labor and reform their minds. Therefore, it differed from the original intent of the “May Seventh Directive” and was not the same thing.
Looking through the records and
memoirs of various people over the years about the Cultural Revolution, examining the influential articles and big-character posters during the Cultural Revolution, and looking at the diaries written by the young revolutionaries of those years, we find that the “May 7th Directive” is rarely mentioned; most do not mention it at all. In other words, even during the most enthusiastic era, even at the time of its release, the “May 7th Directive” did not display any intoxicating or immense charm, nor did it have any significant impact or impact in reality.
Nowadays, when people reflect on the communist movement, it is often said: the reason the communist movement has brought so many atrocities and evils is because it promises an incredibly beautiful ideal society; It is precisely because the purpose is so beautiful that people believe it can be done by any means necessary; To create a paradise on earth, the Gulag was built. But in reality, the grand blueprint for communism personally drawn by the great leader, when presented to us in concrete planning form, has never stirred our boundless longing or fervor. This raises a major new topic for us to reflect on the Cultural Revolution and the communist movement. The fervor shown by the masses during the Cultural Revolution is hard to attribute to the encouragement of the May 7th Directive. We have no reason to characterize the Cultural Revolution as Mao Zedong’s realization of his vision of a communist ideal state or so-called utopian social transformation project.
4. The Cultural Revolution was mainly a struggle for power, but it was not purely a struggle for power
Above, I have briefly discussed what the Cultural Revolution is not. Next, let me talk about what the Cultural Revolution was.
I believe the Cultural Revolution was mainly a power struggle, but it was not purely a power struggle.
In 1958, Mao Zedong launched the Great Leap Forward and the Three Red Banners, causing three years of famine that starved to the deaths of three to forty million people, committing heinous crimes. From then on, he became guilty and fearful of losing power, letting others usurp the Party and seize power, and fearing being purged like Stalin after death. Therefore, Mao wanted to launch a major purge to maintain his power during life and his status after death.
In fact, this nature of the Cultural Revolution was already revealed in two important texts at the very beginning of the revolution. The first is Yao Wenyuan’s critical article published in the Wen Hui Po on November 10, 1965, titled “Review of the Newly Rewritten Historical Drama< Hai Rui’s Dismissal >.” First, Lin Biao’s speech at the expanded meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on May 18, 1966. Yao Wenyuan criticized Wu Han’s script as using the past to satirize the present, specifically linking it to “temporary economic difficulties caused by three consecutive years of natural disasters,” the anti-China uprising, the “anti-China uprising,” and “the scoundrels and demons sweeping through a wave of ‘single-sided style’ and ‘reopening of cases.’” This is a self-admitted confession, exposing Mao’s real concern: he was afraid of being held accountable for the three years of famine (Mao blamed Yao Wen for missing the vital spot). Mao pointed out that the key point of ‘Hai Rui Dismissed from Office’ was ‘dismissal from office’: ‘We dismissed Peng Dehuai from office at the Lushan Conference.’ This not only confirmed Mao’s guilty conscience over the Three Red Banners issue, but also showed that Mao launched the Cultural Revolution to target his senior Party colleagues. Lin Biao’s May 18th Speech emphasized the “anti-coup.” Lin Biao said: “Domestic and foreign, domestic is the main focus.” Inside and outside the Party, the Party itself is primary. The upper and lower levels—the upper layers are the main focus, and the danger lies in the upper layers. After Khrushchev emerged in the Soviet Union, the whole country changed color. “We now support Chairman Mao, and after a hundred years from Mao, we will support Chairman Mao as well.” Mao Zedong Thought must be passed down forever. Chairman Mao lived to that day, at 90 or over 100 years old, he was the highest leader of our Party, and his words became the guiding principles for our actions. “Behind him, if anyone makes a secret report like Khrushchev’s, they must be an ambitious man, a great villain. The whole party should punish them, the whole country should punish them.” Shortly after, at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, Lin Biao clearly stated that this movement “was about dismissing a group of people from office, promoting a group of people, and protecting a group of people.” There must be a comprehensive organizational adjustment. This clearly shows that the Cultural Revolution was a major purge, aimed at safeguarding Mao’s supreme power and status behind his back.
The Cultural Revolution was a power struggle, but it was not purely a power struggle. If it is purely a power struggle, meaning the two sides have no major differences in policy or direction, then regardless of who wins or loses, apart from the fate of those involved in the power struggle, it will have no significant impact on the general social landscape or the lives of ordinary people. The Cultural Revolution was clearly not like this. There were indeed differences in line between Mao and Liu. However, it should be pointed out that to what extent the accusations against Liu Shaoqi’s so-called capitalist line are true, and to what extent they are “fabricated accusations” or “groundless accusations” must be carefully distinguished. Is Liu Shaoqi really going to take the capitalist path? Obviously, it’s not quite the case yet. This is the first point. Second, what is Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line? It should be noted that many of Mao’s proposals and ideas during the Cultural Revolution were either merely concealment or going along with mistakes, while others were merely political maneuvers or expedient measures. This is why many of Mao’s proposals were either broad and lacking specific regulations; or contradictory and confused; Or it starts strong but ends weak, abandons the topic, and leaves the story unresolved.
For example, in economic policy, Mao knew that the approach he had adopted during the Great Leap Forward wouldn’t work, but he wanted to prove that Liu Shaoqi’s later approach was “revisionism” and should be rejected. However, he could not come up with a new approach to replace it, so he was content to just put forward slogans and increase the frequency and intensity of political movements. Politically, the Paris Commune principle was repeatedly mentioned in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. When Mao affirmed Nie Yuanzi’s dazibao, he had already said that this poster was the “Beijing Commune Manifesto of the 20th Century.” Its sixteen articles explicitly stipulated that a comprehensive electoral system like the Paris Commune should be implemented. However, when the January 1967 turmoil came and the Shanghai rebels seized power and planned to name it “Shanghai People’s Commune,” Mao expressed disapproval. The comprehensive elections stipulated in Article 16 were only implemented when some units established Cultural Revolution Committees or Revolutionary Committees (of course, those were not truly democratic elections), and none of the regional revolutionary committees were elected by universal suffrage (including the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, which served as a model for power struggle). In March 1967, Red Flag magazine published an article discussing the establishment of the Revolutionary Committee, avoiding the Paris Commune-style comprehensive elections, instead proposing that leaders of revolutionary mass organizations, PLA garrison leaders, and revolutionary cadres in party and government organs “deliberate and consult.” By February 1968, an article in Red Flag magazine simply stated that “superstition in elections is a conservative mindset.” The May 7th Directive was considered to represent Mao’s ‘establishment’ principle, but it was not vigorously implemented. Although the May Seventh Cadre School was named after this directive and appeared to be a testing ground for it, in the end, it was merely a gathering ground for cadres stationed on the sidelines.
Some have always claimed that Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution to realize his ideal of equality. This theory is highly questionable. Not to mention the harsh criticism of equality in documents like the May 16 Notice, even the Yan’an Spirit praised by Mao was far from equality. The CCP implemented “One Country, Two Systems” in Yan’an, with a supply system benefiting only within the CCP bloc, excluding ordinary people in the border region. Moreover, Yan’an’s supply system was also “clothing divided into five colors, food into nine grades” (Wang Shiwei’s words), with very clear hierarchies. The communist ideal aims to eliminate the three major disparities, but it was only after the CCP came to power that the dual urban-rural household registration system was introduced, expanding and institutionalizing the urban-rural and worker-peasant distinctions. This inevitably brings to mind Orville’s slogan from “Animal Farm”—”All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.” “Another example: during the Cultural Revolution, the college entrance examination system was abolished, all middle school students were driven out of the countryside, and opportunities like university recommendations and recruitment for the military were not strictly standardized, and connections were used to get through connections. Among so-called workers, peasants, and soldiers, the proportion of university students were children of cadres. During the campaign to criticize Lin and Confucius, the masses opposed backdoor connections, but Mao said that even good people do so. This is even more unequal than before the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, we know there is a famous paradox regarding egalitarianism: does a large-scale political movement promoting equality need a leader? Once there is a distinction between leaders and the masses, can they still be equal? Probably no one would deny that one of the greatest features of the Mao era was that Mao himself enjoyed enormous, unchecked power. During the Cultural Revolution era, the inequality of power in China was extremely rare. This alone is a great irony of Mao Fadong’s claim that emphasizing the realization of his ideal of equality.
If what was said above is generally correct, then we can understand that Mao’s main motivation for the Cultural Revolution was for power; ideals and ideals were mostly just excuses and means. Mao said: “No destruction, no establishment; breaking comes first, and establishing is within it.” But the overall impression of the Cultural Revolution was that there was more destruction and few establishments—only destruction but no rebuilding. In fact, this just shows that Mao doesn’t have a fully mature set of things of his own; he’s just quick to deny others.
Many people asked, if the purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to overthrow Liu Shaoqi, then why resort to such a form? On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong once said to Liu Shaoqi’s face: “I only need to move my little finger to defeat you.” This may be an exaggeration, but if it was only to overthrow Liu Shaoqi, Mao Zedong really had no reason to insist on the Cultural Revolution.
But the problem was, following the routine of internal Party struggles from 1949, it was difficult to put Liu Shaoqi to death, and thus hard to prevent Liu Dongshan from rising again. On January 17, 1967, the slogan “Down with Liu Shaoqi” had already spread across the country. When Mao met with Chen Ping, General Secretary of the Malaysian Communist Party, he hypocritically said: “The Cultural Revolution is definitely not about overthrowing everything. Regarding Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, my opinion is that at the next Party Congress, they should still be elected as Central Committee members.” There are always left, center, and right within the Party, so being clean is not good. But it was very dangerous, and the Red Guards might not agree. “Note that the Red Guards might not agree”: we now all know that even the slogan “Down with Liu Shaoqi” was actually proposed by the Central Cultural Revolution Group to the Red Guard leaders directly. This is why Mao wanted to break free from the conventions of intra-Party struggle and instead use the masses as a pretext to carry out mass movements.
The claim that the Party had a command led by Liu Shaoqi was naturally unfounded, but there were indeed quite a few cadres within the Party who agreed with Liu Shaoqi. Since Liu took charge, his work had been quite effective and his influence had greatly increased. Mao Zedong was not confident in carrying out intra-Party struggle, and the delay in holding the Ninth Congress after the Eighth Congress was clear evidence. Mao’s style of action was to either do or rest. He wanted to eradicate Liu’s system in one fell swoop and use this as a deterrent to other officials, big and small. Because there were too many cadres to be overthrown and those to be bound along, it was impossible to achieve their goals through traditional intra-Party struggle. Moreover, Mao wanted to vigorously promote his confidants and newcomers, whose original positions were too low. By conventional practice, it was impossible to let them occupy key posts by helicopter. This was one reason Mao chose to take the extraordinary measures of the Cultural Revolution.
July 9, 2018, in New York
Note: (omitted).
Source: Tianwen United Society: “Special Issue of the Qualitative Academic Symposium on the Cultural Revolution.”